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1. Introduction 
Trade theorists, since the pioneering work of Kemp (1966). have 
considered the question of national advantage from international factor 
mobility by considering only one factor to be so mobile. 
Kemp analyzed elegantly the question of optimal policies in 2 x 2 x 2 
model and showed that, since monopoly power could exist in both the goods and 
factor markets in consequence of international capital mobility, the optimal 
policy intervention would generally involve two policy instruments: tariffs 
(-cum-subsidies) on goods and duties(-cum-subsidies) on international capital 
flows. Jones (1967) subsequently extended Kemp’s argument to the second- 
best context by examining the optimal level of one of these instruments when 
the other was arbitrarily set at zero. Elsewhere in this issue, Brecher (1983) 
shows, in an elegant and original contribution, that the Jones policy problem 
is, in fact, a third-best, rather than a second-best, problem, as generally 
believed, and that if only one of the tariff and capital mobility taxes(-cum- 
subsidies) can be used, it is generally possible to improve welfare further by 
admitting an altogether different, domestic policy instrument: namely a 
production or consumption tax-cum-subsidy, as the case may be.’ 
*The research of Bhagwati was supported by the German Marshall Fund Grant No. l-34015. 
The problem analyzed in the paper was posed in Bhagwati (1979) and an early ingenious and 
neglected analysis in Ramaswami (1968) was noted by Bhagwati. We have profited greatly from 
these contributions; also from reading Webb (1970), Ramaswami (1970) and a recent paper of 
Calvo and Wellisz (1983) on this problem. 
‘This result is in consonance with the results of Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1969) 
for the case without international capital mobility; but the consonance is ‘intuitive’ only after the 
result was established for the case with international capital mobility. 
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Interesting as this line of analysis is, it is based on two critical 
assumptions: 
(1) that the other country is passive in the face of policymaking by one 
country, exactly as in the orthodox analysis of optimal policy intervention 
which assumed that the foreign offer curve facing a country is given 
exogenously; and 
(2) that the other factor of production (labour, in the usual 2 x 2 x 2 
analysis of international capital mobility) is internationally immobile. 
The former assumption is traditional in the international-economic- 
theoretic literature on optimal policies for open economies, with such classic 
exceptions as the theory of optimum tariffs with retaliation, as developed by 
Scitovsky (1942), Johnson (1953-54) and later writers. 
But the latter assumption is more crippling in ruling out of consideration 
the fact of international labour mobility and, indeed, its systematic regulation 
by the policy instrument of immigration restrictions by nation states since 
the beginning of the twentieth century. As it happens, an important and 
novel question that has appeared in the policy context is precisely whether it 
would be to the national advantage of a’capital-abundant country to export 
capital (a la the Marxist-Leninist prediction of monopoly capitalism) or to 
import labour (as countries such as West Germany did through their 
gastarbeiter programs in the postwar period). Bhagwati (1979) raised this 
question in the Ramaswami Memorial Lecture as follows: 
The problem is best illustrated with regard to the migration of labor to the 
United States. As you are doubtless aware, the USA has an enormous 
inflow of illegal migrants who come in principally from Latin America and, 
in turn, mostly from Mexico. The immigration barriers have not been 
successful in stemming this inflow which is variously estimated as having 
led to a stock of close to 10 million illegal immigrants. In response to this 
inflow, and as a result of the growing and effective trade union pressures, 
the Carter administration has had to take cognizance of the problem in its 
social, legal and economic dimensions. In this context, it has occasionally 
been suggested that the United States ought to encourage the flow of 
funds, both private and public, in order to create more prosperity in 
Mexico to reduce the economic disparities that fuel the illegal exodus. 
With regard to the deployment of public funds, in the form of foreign 
assistance, towards this end, it is of course possible to think of this as a 
bribe to the countries of illegal emigration to use their control machinery 
more effectively to stem the illegal migration. For, democracies such as the 
United States, with their strong civil-libertarian and liberal lobbies, are not 
in a position to start shooting happily at the illegal migrants and the 
effectiveness of controls on migration may be enhanced from the 
emigration end by offering suitable incentives to these countries of 
emigration. 
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But, even if this is true, the fact remains that the principal motivation 
behind such a policy remains the creation of more job opportunities and 
improved standards of living in the poorer countries of emigration. 
But this immediately suggests a related and interesting question. 
Suppose that we have a capital-rich country, the United States, and a 
capital-poor country, Mexico. Assume that the United States can 
unilaterally decide on two alternative courses of action, both assumed to be 
feasible: i.e., that it allows its capital to migrate to Mexico, while effectively 
closing the border to immigration; or alternatively that it prohibits capital 
outflow but permits immigration of Mexican labor. If then the United 
States can also choose optimal taxes and subsidies on such factor flows, so 
that we wind up comparing optimal ways of choosing between the two 
forms of mobility, which would be to greater national advantage? 
This precise formulation of the analytical question, which Ramaswami 
(1968) happened to pose in a neglected and ingenious contribution utilizing a 
one-good model, is however analogous to the KetipJones-Brecher analysis 
in that it treats international labour mobility as symmetric in its implications 
with international capital mobility, the only difference being that one may 
yield higher welfare to the policymaking country. However, the two types of 
international mobility are asymmetric in two important respects. 
First, while it is generally possible to tax capital outflows from a country, 
the reverse taxation of labour coming into a country by the country of 
‘immigration’ is not such a straightforward matter. As the discussion of the 
proposal of Bhagwati’s (1978) to ‘tax the brain drain’ made manifest, the 
(discriminatory) taxation by the country of residence of foreign labour is 
fraught with numerous difficulties from legal, constitutional, human-rights 
and political standpoints.’ Therefore, the economic theorist must rank-order, 
as in Ramaswami’s (1968) classic paper, not just the optimal taxation of 
outflowing capital by the capital-rich country with the optimal taxation of 
incoming (foreign) labour by the capital-rich country. A realistic policy 
comparison must augment the policy set to include therefore the rank- 
ordering of policies where the discriminatory taxation of incoming foreign 
labour is not allowed, thus permitting an asymmetry in the tax-jurisdictional 
scope in regard to the taxation of one’s capital outflow and the taxation of 
the other’s labour outflow into one’s country. 
‘Many of these difficulties are discussed in Bhagwati and Partington (1976). However, they do 
not extend to the country of nationaky exercising income tax jurisdiction over its citizens 
resident abroad. What we are discussing in the text is the country of residence exercising its own 
tax jurisdiction in an overtly discriminatory fashion on foreign residents: e.g. by levying a 10 
percent surcharge on the income of foreigners resident in the country. The economics of the 
former question has been explored in a Symposium in the Journal of Public Economics (vol. 18, 
no. 3, 1982) by Bhagwati (1982), Bhagwati and Hamada (1982), Baumol (1982), Mirrlees (1982) 
and Wilson (1982a, 1982b). 
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Second, international labour mobility raises the added difficulty that, once 
labour crosses national borders, we have to worry about which country’s 
welfare it ought to be included in. As Bhagwati (1979) has argued, the 
investment of capital abroad does not affect, in principle, the group over 
which ‘national’ welfare will be defined. By contrast, the ‘migration’ of 
human beings raises the question: Which national group do the migrants 
belong to? There is no universal answer to this question. Migrants who are 
temporary, because of explicit rules in that regard as with gastarbeiters in 
Western Europe and imported workers in the oil-rich Middle East, evidently 
will classify as part of the ‘national’ population in the country of origin. But 
what of permanently emigrating nationals? If they do ‘go away’ for good, 
there is a convincing case for treating ‘national’ welfare as defined only over 
‘those left behind’. On the other hand, as seems to be the case today with a 
large fraction of the highly skilled migration from the less developed 
countries to the developed countries, if this migrant population is 
characterized by retention of ethnic ties to the country of origin, a high 
frequency of visits and even continuation of citizenship status in many cases, 
the fact of permanent migration (embodied in the holding of immigrant visas) 
is thoroughly compatible with the analyst including such migrants in the 
definition of ‘national’ welfare for the country of origin. When we rank-order 
the optimal taxation of capital outflow with the optimal taxation of labour 
inflow, as in Ramaswami (1968), we are treating the foreign labour as part of 
the foreign country’s welfare function. But then we need also to consider the 
possibility that it may be regarded, after immigration, to be part of one’s 
own welfare. 
In the analysis below of the choice between capital and labour mobility 
from the viewpoint of national advantage, therefore, we will be mindful of 
these important asymmetries introduced by international labour, as against 
capital, mobility. We will utilize Ramaswami’s one-good model, which 
eliminates the necessity to look simultaneously at the implications in the 
goods market that lead to the complexity of the KempJones-Brecher 
analysis. Using this model, we will consider the welfare-effects in a two- 
country model where the capital-rich country uses (1) a free international 
factor mobility policy, (2) a quota policy in regard to capital outflow and 
labour inflow, (3) an optimal capital-outflow tax policy, and (4) alternative 
discriminatory tax policies on inflow of labour. Evidently, policies (lH3) do 
not, but policies (4) do, require having to differentially tax ‘immigrant’ 
labour; and where the differential taxation of foreign labour is inadmissible, 
the rank-ordering of policies will have to exclude policies (4). We will 
principally consider, in section 2, the case where welfare of immigrant labour 
is considered part of only foreign welfare. 3 In section 3, however, we briefly 
3Also see the analysis in Calve and Wellisz (1983) which considers these issues utilizing the 
Ramaswami one-good model as well. Of interest also is the exchange between Ramaswami 
(1970) and Webb (1970). 
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indicate the complexities introduced in the case when this cannot be 
assumed. 
2. Immigrants’ welfare part of only foreign welfare 
Consider now a one-good model with two countries, America (A) and 
Mexico (M), with two factors of production (K and L), where A has initially 
a higher endowment ratio of capital such that (KA/LA)>(Khl/LM). The 
technology is, moreover, considered, as in Ramaswami, to be identical 
between A and M and characterized by the usual restrictions, such as 
constant returns to scale and the Inada conditions. 
Given this specification, consider fig. 1. The overall capital and labour 
endowment of America and Mexico determines the size of the box diagram. 
E represents the initial endowment point, such that 0,N and 0,Z are the 
capital and labour endowmentq’respectively, of America, and PN and ZQ of 













( America 1 
t- 0~ (Mexico) 
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Fig. 1 
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curve for the world endowment. Any point of allocation of world factor 
supply on this contract curve is evidently Pareto-efficient; along the diagonal, 
the wage-rental ratio is invariant. E, on the other hand, is off the contract 
curve and yields, in an initial autarkic (i.e. no international factor mobility) 
situation, Qi output for America and QE output for Mexico. Since we have 
constant returns to scale and identical world technology, we can equally 
measure the outputs along the diagonal and read the output of America as 
OAR and of Mexico as 0,s. Finally, consider throughout that America is the 
policymaking country and that Mexico can take no policy action at all. 
2.1. Free factor mobility 
Suppose now that America allows free factor mobility. It is evident then 
that the triangle EDD’ defines the range of possible equilibrium outcomes for 
factor distribution among the two countries. Thus, ED’ of capital could flow 
out of capital-rich America and that would equalize wage-rental ratios in the 
two countries at D’; or ED, Mexican labour, could flow into America and 
again wage-rental ratios would be equalized identically at D; or 
combinations of such capital outflow from, and labour inflow into, America 
could lead the world-allocation of the overall factor supply to equilibrium 
anywhere along DD’ at the same wage-rental ratio. 
What about the welfare impact? It is immediately clear that, in all cases, 
America goes from OAR to 0,C and Mexico from 0,s to O,C, so that 
America gains RC, Mexico gains CS, and the world’s gain is RS. To see this, 
take the case where ED, Mexican labour, moves into America. America’s 
GDP then is 0,D. However, Mexican labour ED earns CD, since the 
equilibrium wage-rental ratio is EC. Therefore, America’s GNP is (0,D 
- CD) = O,C, implying a gain of RC. By identical reasoning, Mexico’s GNP 
goes from 0,s to O,C, representing a gain of CS. Identically, these results 
follow when the factor reallocation settles anywhere else on DD’. Especially, 
if American capital of amount ED’ flows out, American GDP will be 0,D’; 
the earnings of ED’, American capital in Mexico, will be D’C, and hence 
American GNP will again be 0,C; American gain from the autarkic position 
will again be RC; and Mexican gain can similarly be shown to be CS. 
2.2. Quotas on factor mobility 
Consider next the possibility of utilizing quantitative restrictions by 
America on (i) immigration of Mexican labour and on (ii) outflow of 
American capital. [Note that this policy does not involve discriminatory, 
taxation of either factor.] 
Of course, if only one of these policies is utilized, the other factor will 
move internationally until the world equilibrium winds up along DD’, 
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creating the same outcome as under free factor mobility. Suppose, however, 
that both quotas are utilized simultaneously. Take then two polar cases: (i) 
no capital outflow is permitted and labour inflow is restricted below ED; and 
(ii) no labour inflow is permitted and capital outflow is restricted below ED’. 
In the former case it is readily seen that, given the capital immobility, the 
restriction of labour inflow below ED is welfare-worsening for America. For, 
if more Mexcan labour comes in, it produces increasing gain to America by 
driving down its own reward due to diminishing returns: and this continues 
until the inflow is stopped by wage equalization between both countries at D. 
Therefore, any immigration restriction that restricts the Mexican labour 
inflow below ED will reduce American gain below RC and reduce world gain 
below RS by pushing the world allocation off the contract curve O*O,. As 
for Mexico, it will also gain from the restricted outflow of its labour to 
America and its gain may be less or greater than or equal to CS (which is 
the gain from unrestricted outflow up to ED). 
Consider now the latter case, where the labour flow is eliminated but 
America does not allow full outflow of American capital by amount ED’ to 
reach the contract curve. We then have an asymmetric result for America. 
For, from the American standpoint, it will pay America to restrict the 
outflow of capital to the point where the marginal return abroad equals its 
marginal product at home. This optimal export restriction on capital outflow, 
say EF, will then produce for America a gain exceeding RC; the world will 
gain less than RS; and Mexico will gain less than CS. 
Thus, we have the asymmetrical result that, if only labour inflow is to be 
permitted, capital-rich America ought to allow it to the free-immigration 
level; whereas, if only capital outflow is to be permitted, America ought to 
restrict it. This asymmetry, of course, follows from the fact that American 
capital is essentially driving down its reward in Mexico and hence its 
marginal return is below its average return there so that restriction of capital 
outflow below the free-outflow level is desirable; whereas when Mexican 
labour is coming into America, it is Mexico that is correspondingly losing 
(part of its) gains from the labour outflow to higher-wage America, and 
therefore it is America that is gaining, so that American advantage (though 
not Mexican advantage, of course) is best pursued by America letting 
Mexican labour come in freely! 
The welfare outcomes under these alternative policies are readily illustrated 
by reference to the familiar marginal-product curves in figs. 2 and 3 for the 
capital-flow and the labour-flow cases, respectively. In fig. 2 the marginal 
product curves for Mexico and America are drawn as WY and NE: with 
equalization of the marginal products and corresponding rentals at outflow 
ED’ from America to Mexico. Optimal capital export from America’s 
standpoint is, however, EH, and is derived by taking the curve WT marginal 
to WY and its intersection with NE: in the usual manner. Then, recalling the 
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measures of gains in fig. 1 for the different policies as RS, CS, RC, etc. and, 
examining fig. 2, we can infer the results shown in table 1. 
Similarly, for the labour immigration case, using fig. 3, we readily see that 
American advantage is maximized at E: at which ED level of free- 
immigration labour inflow yields a gain to America worth WMY: a gain that 
can only bc rrjuced if the labour inflow is reduced by an arbitrary quota 
such as i::; which then yiel’ds American gain worth only WXK Thus, we can 
infer the I.c:\ults in table 2. 
Capital-outflow Policies 
































But the rank-ordering of policies just derived depends critically on the 
assumption that America cannot levy discriminatory taxation on foreign 
labour as an instrument of policy. This yields an advantage, as we have just 
seen, to capital-outflow vis-i-vis the labour-inflow policies in America when 
it maximizes its national advantage. But as soon as we admit the possibility 
of levying taxation on immigrant (but not on national) labour, this 
advantage gets reversed, as we note immediately below. 
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Labour - inflow Policies 
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1. World gain 
2. American gain 
3. Mexican gain 
Fig. 2 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 1 
WNYV (=RS) WVTN (<RS) 
MNY (=RC) XVTN (>RC) 
WMY (=CS) wvx (<CS) 
2.3. Discriminatory taxation of foreign labour 
First, we should note that discriminatory taxation of American capital 
outflow by America produces an identical result as the American restriction 
of such outflow which we just discussed. 
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Table 2 






1. World gain 
2. American gain 
3. Mexican gain 




2.3.1. Optimal tax on labour injlow 
On the other hand, the discriminatory taxation of Mexican labour by 
America enables America to gain more than it would simply by restricting 
Mexican labour inflow to a level identical to that produced by the tax policy. 
For example, in fig. 3, if Mexican labour inflow is restricted to EG by a 
quota, it will yield a gain WXV to America. But if this inflow is achieved by 
a tax on Mexican labour that effectively shifts the Mexican supply curve 
NPY up to cut WVY at K the American gain will be WVPQ (> WI/X by 
XVPQ, the tax revenues from the Mexican inflow of EG at tax rate VP/PG). 
And, for an optimal tax policy by America, this gain for America will exceed 
that under free immigration (i.e. WMY). That is to say, if I/ were obtained, 
and the corresponding optimal tax rate was set by taking the marginal curve 
to NPY and intersecting it with WVX we would be equating the marginal 
cost of Mexican labour supply to its marginal product in America and thus 
showing VPlPG as the welfare-maximizing American tax on Mexican labour. 
Such an optimal labour-inflow tax policy by America will therefore yield a 
gain exceeding RC in fig. 1, while it will get the world allocation off the 
contract curve and reduce world gain below RS. Mexico, on the other hand, 
will find its gain reduced below CS. 
Ramaswami (1968) ingeniously showed, moreover, that such an optimal 
tax policy on inflowing Mexican labour would produce a greater gain to 
America than the optimal tax-cum-restriction on American capital outflow. 
The policies being compared appear, at first blush, to be impossible to 
compare analytically. Ramaswami, however, managed to rank-order them 
with the following remarkable argument. Following him, consider the 
hypothetical experiment where, starting from the optimal capital-export 
policy of export of American capital at level EF in fig. 1, America brings this 
capital back home while simultaneously permitting only EG amounts of 
Mexican labour into America. By construction, then, the Mexican capital- 
labour ratio at F and G is the same. Therefore, if we now envisage America 
producing the single good in this model with two techniques, one technique 
J.N. Bhagwati and TN. Srinivasan, Capital and labour mobility 219 
using 0,Z units of American labour and ZF units of American capital, and 
the other technique using EF units of American capital with EG units of 
immigrant Mexican labour, America will earn the same income as with the 
optimal export of EF units of capital. For, the earnings of these EF units of 
capital will be identical at F and G, by construction. Equally, the identity of 
capital-labour ratios at F and G implies that the hypothesized withdrawal of 
EF units of American capital and importation of EG units of Mexican 
labour is a feasible immigration policy for America since it leaves American 
capital at its original endowment while paying Mexican labour its marginal 
product in Mexico. Therefore, an immigration policy, which produces the 
single good with one technique and the same factors of production while 
paying Mexican labour the same amount as in the two-technique solution 
just discussed, should do better for America. And, if Mexican labour import 
is varied optimally around EG (which was not optimally chosen, of course), 
there should be still further gain. Hence, it is evident that the policy of 
optimal taxation of labour inflow dominates the policy of optimal taxation- 
cum-restriction of capital outflow by capital-rich America. 
2.3.2. Perfectly-discriminating tax policy 
Yet another policy may be considered, which taxes away all the gains from 
Mexican labour inflow by taxing in a ‘perfectly discriminatory’ fashion. Thus, 
in fig. 3, assume that America can tax each Mexican labourer to extract the 
full difference between his American marginal product (= wage) and his 
Mexican marginal product (= wage forgone). 
In that case, the entire world gain W YN from the Mexican labour inflow 
will accrue to America and the Mexican non-migrant population will suffer a 
loss equal to wages earned in America by the migrants. By reference to fig. 1, 
we can readily see that the world resource allocation will shift from E to 
(Pareto-efficient) D, the world gain will be RS, the American gain will also be 
RS, and the Mexican gain will be zero. 
The results of these two types of discriminatory-taxation policies are 
presented in table 3. 
Table 3 
Discriminatory tax policies on labour inflow. 
Gain 
1. World gain 
2. American gain 
3. Mexican gain 
Optimal-for-America 
tax on labour inflow 
(<ED) 






tax on labour inflow 
(ED) 
Fig. 3 Fig. 1 
WNY (=RS) 
WNY (=RS) 
zero ( = zero) 
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2.4. Rank-ordering of alternative.policies 
From the viewpoint of American advantage, therefore, we get a remarkable 
and strong rank-ordering of policies: perfectly-discriminatory tax on labour 
inflow > optimal tax on labour inflow > optimal tax-cum-restriction on capital 
outflow >free factor mobility>restriction on labour inflow. Of this rank- 
ordering, it is the dominance of the optimal tax on labour outflow over the 
optimal tax on capital inflow that Ramaswami (1968) established. 
3. Immigrants’ welfare not necessarily part of only foreign welfare 
The analysis so far has assumed that Mexican migrants’ welfare continues 
to be part of only Mexican welfare. We must however address a few 
pertinent remarks to the possibility where this is not the case. Thus, the 
Mexican migrants’ welfare may be regarded as part of American welfare. 
[We should also reckon with the possibilities that the migrants’ welfare is 
not counted in either Mexican or American welfare, and that alternatively (in 
a benign world) it is considered by American and Mexican policymakers to 
be part of both rather than neither!] Simply to illustrate the differences in 
conclusions that can arise, once these considerations are introduced, we focus 
here on the case where the Mexican migrant labour becomes part of 
American welfare (as indeed it unambiguously would if, after the 5-year 
residence requirement, naturalization ensued). 
The basic difficulty that this change of assumption about the national 
characterization of initially Mexican labour makes is that the different policy 
rankings that we considered in the section 2 are no longer welfare- 
comparable, without added assumptions, since the population over which 
they are defined will generally differ. Thus, the capital-export policies will 
involve the initial American population; whereas the labour quota and 
taxation policies will each result in different levels of immigration of Mexican 
labour and hence of the American population. Given this problem, the 
analyst has no option but to settle for welfare criteria such as the resulting 
per capita income level under alternative policies, or some explicit cardinal 
weighting of the different individuals under the different policy options. 
Thus, consider the per capita income criterion and focus on American 
advantage to see how the rank-ordering of our policies can change from that 
derived in section 2. Turning to fig. 1, it is then easy to see that free factor 
mobility, to any point on the diagonal stretch bD’, will yield an identical per 
capita income level so that all points on DD’ continue to be weakly-ranked. 
However, the optimum optimorum perfectly-discriminating tax policy on 
Mexican labour inflow is no longer superior to the policy of free factor 
mobility since the fact that it transfers the gains from the Mexican migrants 
to pre-migration American natives is no longer an advantage! 
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